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China is the largest reserve holder among developing countries, having 
amassed over US$ 600 billion of reserves by end 2004. Given the potential 
liquidity overhang concerns in China due to the rapid reserve buildup, the 
People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has actively attempted to sterilize these 
inflows using a combination of market-based and administrative measures 
to mop up the excess liquidity. This paper focuses on the magnitude and 
sources of reserve buildup in China as well as their monetary consequences 
since the 1990s. It undertakes an econometric investigation to assess the de 
facto extent of monetary sterilization by estimating a set of simultaneous 
equations explicitly derived from an optimizing framework to examine the 
relationship between net domestic assets and net foreign assets.  
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  Despite the seeming frailty of pegged regimes, there appears to be a continued 
fixation with US dollar pegs, especially in Asia. For instance, China, Hong Kong and 
Malaysia all maintain firm US dollar pegs (unlike the other two, the Hong Kong dollar is 
backed by a currency board arrangement). Many supposed floaters also seem to heavily 
manage their currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar (Cavoli and Rajan, 2005 and McKinnon 
and Schnabl, 2004).  While the nominal anchor rationale for a peg may have some validity 
in general, it can be taken too far, and is probably less of a concern for many Asian 
developing countries which have generally maintained relatively low inflation rates.
1 And 
while there is a widespread belief that a pegged regime induces greater policy discipline, 
the effects of unsound macro policies become evident immediately under flexible rates 
through exchange rate and price level movements (i.e. depreciation-inflation spiral). As 
such, it could be argued that flexible exchange rates instill relatively greater fiscal 
restraint/discipline as the costs of macroeconomic policy transgressions have to be paid 
upfront (Tornell and Velsaco, 2000).
 2  
Nonetheless, an oft-noted virtue of a US dollar peg appears to be its transparency, 
and the simplicity of operating such a regime (in normal circumstances). Thus, it is well 
known that the Malaysian ringgit is fixed at 3.80 to the US dollar, the Chinese renminbi is 
pegged at 8.28 per US dollar, and the Hong Kong dollar is set at 7.80 per US dollar.
3 There 
is no ambiguity about any of this, and private agents -- exporters, importers, financial 
                                                 
1  See Willett (1998) for a detailed exploration of the nominal anchor debate. Moreno (2002) 
questions the relevance of a pegged regime for East Asia in keeping inflation rates low. 
  
2  Similarly, the endogeneity argument of a fixed exchange rate seems to have been largely 
discredited – one need look no further than the Argentine crisis of the late 1990s.  
 
3 The Hong Kong has recently moved away from a rigid peg, having effectively introduced a  




market participants and foreign direct investors -- can go about their respective activities 
accordingly. The need for stability to promote international trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is something that has been repeatedly emphasized by Asian policy 
makers.
4 Concerns about the potential vulnerability of the domestic financial systems to 
variations in exchange rates have also been expressed in defense of a US dollar pegged 
system, particularly in China.
 5 
The fixed -- or heavily managed -- exchange rate regimes operated by many Asian 
developing countries even post 1997-98 has in turn contributed to a notable global 
macroeconomic development, viz. the rapid buildup of reserves in Asia (for instance, see 
Kim et al., 2005 and references cited within). The largest reserve holder among developing 
countries is China; it amassed over US$ 600 billion of reserves by end of 2004 (Figure 1), 
equivalent to about two-fifth of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP).
6 Given the 
potential liquidity overhang concerns in China due to a massive and rapid reserve buildup, 
the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has actively used a combination of market-based and 
administrative measures to mop up the excess liquidity. However, the extent and success of 
sterilization remains in doubt. 
                                                 
4 See Rajan (2002) for references on the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on trade and FDI 
flows. Also see Clark et al. (2004). Of course, a single currency peg leaves a country vulnerable to 
fluctuations in a third currency, a problem faced by Asia pre 1997 following the appreciation of the 
US dollar vis-à-vis the Japanese yen (Bird and Rajan, 2002 and McKinnon and Schnabl, 2003).    
5 While official figures place China’s non-performing loans (NPLs) at about 15 to 20 percent of the 
total, most other estimates place them at over 40 percent (Holland and Lague, 2004 and Lin, 2003). 
It is partly because of concerns about banks and inefficient state-owned enterprises that the PBOC 
has been reluctant to raise interest rates, having increased them marginally once in October 2004. 
In addition, interest rate hikes could precipitate capital inflows. 
6 Japan is, of course, the world’s largest holder (about US$ 830 billion as of December 2004). The 
other top reserve holders are all Asian as well – Taiwan, Korea, India, Singapore and Hong Kong – 




The next section explores the evolution of the balance of payments flows in China 
since the 1990s, focusing on the magnitude and sources of reserve buildup as well as their 
monetary consequences. Section 3 undertakes an econometric investigation to assess the de 
facto extent of sterilization by estimating a set of simultaneous equations to examine the 
relationship between net domestic assets and net foreign assets. In particular, we 
simultaneously estimate the “sterilization coefficient”, i.e. how much domestic credit 
changes in response to a change in international reserves, as well as the “offset 
coefficient”, i.e. how much private capital changes in response to a change in domestic 
credit. The analysis uses quarterly data between 1995: q1 and 2004: q4. The vectors of 
controls in the simultaneous equations are derived from an explicitly optimizing 
framework based on Brissimis-Gibson-Tsakalotos or BGT (2002). The final section 
concludes with a brief discussion of the macroeconomic policy implications and tradeoffs 
facing China going forward. 
 
2.  Dynamics of Reserves and Monetary Growth in China Since the 1990s 
2.1  Evolution of China’s Balance of Payment Account 
An examination of trends in the growth of China's reserves suggests that one can 
identify various sub-periods since 1990 (Figure 1).  
China's reserves remained stagnant in 1990 and 1991 and actually declined in 1992, 
as small surpluses on the current and capital accounts were more than offset by capital 
flight, as witnessed by the negative balance in the errors and omissions category. However, 
things changed once the Chinese Renminbi (RMB) was officially devalued from 5.8 RMB 
per US dollar to 8.45 in January 1994. Between 1992 and 1996 the surplus in the capital 




errors and omissions balance), such that reserves rose briskly during this period. The 
country’s current account shifted to a surplus from 1997 onwards, though the capital 
account surplus diminished, while capital flight continued unabated. In aggregate, between 
1997 and 2000, China’s reserves remained more or less stagnant. Since 2001, China has 
experienced large and growing surpluses on both the capital and current accounts, while 
even the errors and omissions balance turned positive. Thus, reserves increased markedly 
during this period -- almost threefold.  
An interesting dynamic appears to have taken hold in China in recent years (as well 
as many other Asian economies). Large reserves are viewed as a sign that the domestic 
currency has to eventually appreciate. They also tend to be taken as an indication of 
“strong fundamentals”, hence leading to an upgrading of the country's credit ratings. This 
expectation of future capital gains and lower risk perceptions had motivated large-scale 
capital inflows (so-called “capital inflows problem”). This in turn has added to the 
country's stock of reserves as central banks have mopped up excess US dollars to keep the 
bilateral exchange rate stable in nominal terms (Dean and Rajan, 2004).
7 Thus, referring to 
Figure 2, it is apparent that the swelling of China’s capital account surplus was because of 
a surge in portfolio capital flows as well “other investments” (i.e. short term debt flows), 
possibly a reflection of mounting market expectations of an impending revaluation of the 
Chinese currency (i.e. speculation on the RMB as a one-way trade).
8 
                                                 
7 Also see Hu (2004). Two caveats should be noted. One, part of the rise in reserves is also because 
of a valuation effect as a portion of reserves that was invested in non-US dollars (gold, euros, etc) 
has appreciated in US dollar terms (while most central banks including the PBOC do not disclose 
the composition of assets in which reserves are being invested, it is generally suggested that a large 
part has been invested into dollar-denominated assets like Treasury securities). Two, there was a 
one-off fall in reserves in China in 2004. This was because in February 2004 the government 
transferred US$ 45 billion to four state-owned banks, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, 
Agricultural Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, to aid in their 






2.2  Monetary Growth and Sterilization in China 
What are the monetary consequences of this reserve buildup in China? To help fix 
ideas, it is useful to recall that:  
 
M2 = MB * mm . 
 
So,   mm MB mm MB M ∆ × + × ∆ = ∆ 2 mm MB mm NDA NFA ∆ × + × ∆ + ∆ = ) ( ,  
where MB = monetary base; NFA = net foreign assets; NDA = net domestic assets; and mm 
= M2 multiplier. 
  Referring to Figure 3, by and large since 2002: q4, domestic credit (NDA) growth 
remained rather low if not negative. This helped moderate the increase in the domestic 
Monetary Base (MB), suggesting that the PBOC was actively neutralizing the impact of 
the reserves buildup. Since the early-to-mid 1990s,  the PBOC has been relying 
increasingly on open market operations (OMOs) involving government securities to 
influence domestic money supply. As with many of its other Asian counterparts, sustained 
contractionary OMOs to curb liquidity growth has depleted the PBOC’s stock of 
government bonds. In response to this problem, the PBOC started floating its own 
securities (central bank bills) which have since been used in its OMOs (Figure 4).
9 The 
                                                                                                                                                    
8 Indeed, a large number of so-called “qualified foreign investment institutions” or QFIIs received 
approval by the China Securities Regulatory Commission to increase their investments to China 
which in turn has fuelled large-scale portfolio capital inflows (Hu, 2004 elaborates on the QFIIs 
and their impact on capital inflows into China). 
 
9 Unlike the PBOC, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), which operates a managed float and has been 
faced with a similar problem (of depleting stock of government bonds), decided against issuing its 
own bonds for two reasons. One, if the central bank issues its own bonds, it would have to bear the 
costs of sterilization (hence decreasing central bank capital). Two, issuance of central bank bonds 




PBOC has also made fairly frequent use of changes in legal requirements to impact 
domestic liquidity (see Table 1), and in particular, to keep M2 stable (Figure 5). 
 
3.  Estimation of China’s Sterilization and Offset Coefficients 
The previous section has provided a brief overview of the extent of reserve and 
monetary buildup in China in recent years, as well as offered preliminary evidence of the 
presence of monetary sterilization. This section undertakes a more formal empirical 
investigation of the magnitude of sterilization in China by estimating the nexus between 
net domestic assets and net foreign assets using a set of simultaneous equations. The need 
for the use of simultaneous equations is straightforward. As discussed, domestic monetary 
conditions are impacted by a change of international capital flows and foreign reserves. 
Concurrently, international capital flows respond to a change in domestic monetary 




3.1  Overview of the Analytical Framework  
The theoretical model used here takes as a starting point -- but modifies -- the 
innovative model developed by Brissimis-Gibson-Tsakalotos or BGT (2002) which derives 
                                                                                                                                                    
than those issued by the central bank), hence exacerbating the costs of raising much-needed 
finances by the government. Instead, the RBI recently launched so-called market stabilization 
bonds (MSBs), which are to be issued by the Government of India with the specific aim of 
absorbing the liquidity created in the financial system due to foreign exchange intervention. The 
proceeds of the MSBs will not add to the fiscal deficit as they are held in a separate noninterest 
bearing account called the Market Stabilization Scheme (MSS) account which is to be maintained 
and operated by the RBI. The government cannot spend the money available in the MSS account 
except to pay back maturing debt. The MSS account should help improve the transparency of the 
RBI's sterilization operations.  
 
10 Indeed, this is the basic dilemma involved in sterilization (Calvo, 1991), a point we return to in 




both the capital inflow and the monetary reaction functions from explicit minimization of a 
simple loss function of the monetary authority, subject to a number of constraints that 
reflect the workings of the economy.  








2 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t s t r t c t t Y p L σ ε σ δ γ β + + + ∆ =      (1) 
 
The monetary authority’s loss function is determined by the change in the logarithm of the 
price level (i.e. the difference in  t p  and  1 − t p ); cyclical income ( ct Y ); and the volatilities of 
the interest rate ( t r, σ ) and the exchange rate ( t s, σ ).
11 All the parameters are assumed to be 
positive.  





t t t t t t t t s p mm MB mm NDA NFA p ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − 3 1 2 1 ] ) [( π π π                        (2) 
 
where 0   , 1 0   , 0 3 2 1 > < < > π π π . Eq. (2) states that inflation is a monetary phenomenon 
with a lagged effect. In addition, depreciation of the nominal exchange rate (rise in st) 
could increase inflationary pressures due to increased price of imports.  
                                                 
11 We have simplified the original BGT model by including actual changes in inflation and cyclical 
output in the loss function rather than changes of actual (inflation and output) from their respective 
target levels. Other changes include incorporation of the role of government spending on cyclical 






b)   Cyclical income 
 
t c t c t t t t t t c G Y mm MB mm NDA NFA Y , 3 1 , 2 1 , ] ) [( ϕ ϕ ϕ + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = −      (3) 
0 , 1 0    , 0 3 2 1 > < < > ϕ ϕ ϕ . 
 
where: t c G , is the cyclical government expenditure.
12 We assume that both expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policies can boost cyclical output.  
 
c)  Balance of Payments 
 
      t t t NK CA NFA ∆ + = ∆                                                                                    (4) 
 
where: CA is the current account balance and  t NK ∆  is the net capital inflow in time t. 
The current account mainly depends on output and lagged real effective exchange rate 
(to account for inertial effects of real exchange rate change on the trade balance), while the 
net capital inflow depends imperfectly on the uncovered interest differentials: 
 
1 2 , 1 − − − = t t c t REER Y CA α α   0   , 0 2 1 > > α α               (5) 
) ( ) / 1 (
*
1 t t t t t t r r s E s c NK − + − ∆ = ∆ +                     (6) 
 
                                                 






where:  REER is the real effective exchange rate;
13  t s   is the current exchange rate 
(logarithm);  1 + t ts E  is the current expectation of the exchange rate at time t+1;  t r  is the 
domestic interest rate; 
*
t r  is the foreign interest rate; and c represents the degree of relative 
risk aversion between domestic and foreign assets and the extent of capital controls.  
In addition, the interest rate is determined by the change in money supply: 
 
      ] ) [( 1 t t t t t t mm MB mm NFA NDA r ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − = ∆ ψ    0 1 > ψ                           (7) 
 
From (6), we get:  
 
             
*
1 t t t t t t r r s E NK c s ∆ + ∆ − ∆ + ∆ = ∆ +                                                (8) 
 
After Substituting (3), (4), (5), (7) and (8) into (2) we derive: 
 
) ( ) (        
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13 A rise implies a currency appreciation.  
 
14 Note, with a fixed exchange rate, only the first three terms in eq. 9 will be relevant. Referring to 
Figure 1, one notices that there have been a few – albeit infrequent -- variations in the Chinese 
exchange rate over the last decade and a half. Rather than add dummies to capture the periods of 
exchange rate changes, in the empirical analysis (Section 3) we use the more general form as 




d)  Interest rate volatility 
 
) ( 1 1 , , t t t r t r NDA d NDA ∆ − ∆ − = − θ ησ σ     0 , > θ η                       (10) 
 
Interest rate volatility depends negatively on the absolute amount of intervention 
undertaken by the central bank in the domestic money market.  1 d  is the dummy which 
takes on a value of 0 when the money market is in deficit and a value of 2 when it is in 
surplus.  
 
e)  Exchange rate volatility  
 
) ( 2 1 , , t t t s t s NFA d NFA ∆ − ∆ − = − ς κσ σ    0 , > ς κ        ( 1 1 )  
 
Exchange rate volatility depends negatively on the absolute amount of intervention 
undertaken by the central bank in the foreign exchange market.  2 d  is a dummy which 
takes on a value of 2 when there is an excess demand for foreign currency (and the central 
bank is losing reserves) and a value of 0 when foreign currency is in excess supply (and the 
central bank is stock-piling reserves).  
Solving for  0 / = ∆ ∂ ∂ t t NDA L  and  0 / = ∆ ∂ ∂ t t NFA L   and substituting the 
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3 1 1 1 3 1 2 > − + + + + = d mm r mm c u t t δθ ϕ π ϕ α ψ π π β  
Eqs. (12) and (13) are the capital inflow and the monetary reaction functions, 
respectively. The former estimates the impact of a change in net domestic assets (NDA) on 
net foreign assets (NFA) -- so-called “offset coefficient”. The expected value of the offset 
coefficient is bound by 0 on the upper end in the event of no capital mobility, and -1 in the 
event of perfect capital mobility. The sterilization coefficient can be measured by the 
estimated coefficient of the change of net foreign assets in the monetary reaction function. 
The expected value of the sterilization coefficient is -1 if reserve buildup is perfectly 




The capital inflow function (Eq. 12) consists of seven control variables 
incorporating both “push” versus “pull” factors. The former refers to factors that motivate 
capital to leave creditor countries in search of better returns. The latter refers to factors that 
motivate capital flows into specific recipient countries
15. One, a rise in the money 
multiplier for M2 might increase the domestic money and push interest rates down, hence 
reducing capital inflows. Two, higher inflation could perpetuate concerns about exchange 
rate depreciation and interest rate hikes and capital losses thereof, hence causing a 
reduction in capital inflows.
16 Three, foreign reserves will be decumulated due to a fall in 
the current account if the real effective exchange rate appreciates (price effect). Four, 
higher lagged real output could worsen the current account (due to the income effect), 
hence reducing foreign reserve accumulation.
17 Five, an expansionary fiscal policy stance 
(higher government expenditure) will raise cyclical income and once again worsen the 
current account as discussed above. Six, higher exchange rate-adjusted foreign interest 
rates could also lead to capital withdrawals from the country. Seven, higher volatility of 
exchange may increase investment risks and uncertainty for foreign investors, hence 
diminishing the extent of capital inflows.  
                                                 
15 To be sure, while “push” factors from industrial countries determine the timing and magnitude of 
capital flows, “pull” factor determine the geographical distribution of the flows (see Montiel and 
Reinhart, 1999). 
 
16 Additionally, in practice, higher inflation could engender greater uncertainty, leading to reduced 
capital flows. 
 
17 Three caveats should be noted. One, it is important to consider the context of expansionary fiscal 
policy. If done in the event of an economic downturn, the impact may not be similar as if when 
done when output is at or above trend. Two, the focus here is on short term rates; in most 
circumstances one would expect higher budget deficits to cause a rise in long term interest rates. 
Three, it is also important to consider the impact of market expectations. If higher government 
expenditure is viewed as a sign of fiscal profligacy, this could lead to rise in country risk premium 





The monetary policy function (Eq. 13) consists of the same vector of controls as the 
capital inflow function with the one exception being that the volatility of the exchange rate 
is replaced by the volatility of interest rates.
18  
 
3.2  Data, Definitions and Methodology 
The estimation is based on quarterly data over the sample period 1995: q1 to 2004: 
q4. All the data are obtained either from the IMF-IFS or the TEJ Great China Database. 
Table 2 summarizes the definitions and sources of the various data used in the estimating 
equations. Table 3 provides some summary statistics of the key variables to be used in the 
empirical exercise. 
Note that relevant variables -- viz. change of net foreign assets, the change of net 
domestic assets, and cyclical fiscal balance -- were each scaled using GDP and the lagged 
value of reserve money. To be sure, some like Sarijito (1996) use lagged values of reserve 
money as a scaling variable, while others such as Rooskareni (1998) prefer to use nominal 
GDP as the scale. We do not have strong priors as to which might be a better scaling 
variable, so we have tried both in the first instance. To preview the main conclusion, while 
there is no discernible difference in the estimated values of the sterilization and offset 
coefficients using the two scales, in terms of overall fit as well as statistical significance of 
individual independent variables the reserve money as a scaling variable is preferable. 
We applied the unit roots test on each variable to check the stationarity of all 
variables. All variables appear to be stationary except the change of net foreign asset 
scaled by GDP and the lagged value of reserve money respectively (Table 4). We therefore 
detrended change of net foreign asset scaled by GDP and the lagged value of reserve 
                                                 





money respectively to do our estimation. We used the Hodrick-Prescott method to measure 
the trend of real output growth and government fiscal balance. We used the standard 
deviation of the within quarter change in the monthly exchange rate (real effective 
exchange rate) and interest rate (bank rate) to proxy the volatility of exchange rate and 
volatility of domestic interest rate. On the other hand, we assumed that economic agents 
have perfect foresight in forming their expectations on exchange rate. Hence we used the 
difference between the actual nominal exchange rate at the next period and the current 
nominal exchange rate to proxy the expected exchange rate for the next period.  
The simultaneous Equations (Eq. 12 and 13) were estimated using Two-stage least 
squares (2SLS). The estimated results of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) have also been 
included solely for comparison and for the sake of ensuring full transparency of results. 
Since our sample is based on quarterly data, we included three seasonal dummies to 
account for seasonality
 effects. We have also included the lagged values of the explanatory 




3.3 Empirical  Results 
Table 4 provides the summary statistics of the various variables used in the model. 
Tables 5 and 6 summarize the results of the estimating equations using two-stage least 
squares as well as simple OLS for both scaling factors (lagged reserve money and GDP).
20 
With regard to the capital inflows function, the estimated offset coefficient for 
China using the 2SLS is about -0.55 (Table 5).
21 The results indicate that net foreign assets 
                                                 
19 We recognize that including too many lagged values of explanatory variables may cause serious 
multicollinearity problems if the sample size is small and the explanatory variables do not change 
much or move fairly regularly. Hence, the lag length is determined by the F-test. 
 




tend to decline if the money multiplier for M2 increases, the lagged real effective exchange 
rate appreciates, or the exchange rate adjusted foreign interest rates go up. These results are 
consistent with the priors discussed previously. In addition, the lagged value of 
international reserves is statistically and positively significant. The macroeconomic 
variables (viz. cyclical income, fiscal balance and inflation) are statistically insignificant. 
The overall fit using lagged reserve money as a scaling variable is superior to that using 
GDP as the scale. 
2SLS estimates of the monetary reaction function reveals that China has sterilized 
around 75 percent of capital inflows on average since 1995 (Table 6). With regard to other 
explanatory variables, the money multiplier and the exchange rate adjusted foreign interest 
rates are negative and statistically significant as expected a priori. In addition, the lagged 
real effective exchange rate, the lagged inflation rate, and lagged net domestic assets are 
also statistically significant with appropriate signs in the regression estimates based on the 
lagged value of reserve money as a scaling variable (the latter two variables at the 10% 
level). The cyclical government balance and interest rate volatility are also statistically 
significant based on the lagged value of reserve money as a scaling variable at the 10% 
level, though they have different expected signs from our theoretical model.  
Following Cumby and Obstfeld (1983) and Siklos (2000), we have applied the 
forward recursive method to estimate the changing dynamics of the offset and sterilization 
coefficients (Figure 7 and 8 respectively). The first estimate is obtained by using the 
sample from 1995: q1 to 2002: q1, and then each time we add one more observation to re-
                                                                                                                                                    
21 For comparison, Table 7 highlights the estimated coefficients for other developing countries 
during various times in the 1990s. Two caveats should be noted. One, there are no studies we are 
aware that compute these coefficients for China that could serve as a better yardstick of 
comparison. Two, the summary in Table 7 is by no means exhaustive. Only some relatively recent 
studies (since 1990) on developing countries, and only those that use similar technique to ours (i.e. 




estimate the simultaneous equations to get the offset and sterilization coefficients till 2004: 
q4. Note that the estimated offset coefficients are quite stable, hovering around -0.5 to -0.6. 
This is suggestive that China has experienced moderate capital mobility in the latest few 
years. Also note that the estimated sterilization coefficient increased markedly from 
moderate sterilization (-0.45 to -0.55) in 2002 to heavy sterilization in 2004 (-0.7 to -0.8).
22  
 
4. Concluding  Remarks 
 
The empirical analysis in the preceding section highlights that China has been 
actively sterilizing capital inflows since the late 1990s and has consequently borne the 
quasi-fiscal costs of this policy (Calvo, 1991). These quasi-fiscal costs arise if the central 
bank uses open market operations to offset the growth in reserves as it is effectively selling 
high-yielding domestic assets for low-yielding foreign ones. The sterilization costs may be 
unsustainable over time and can be counterproductive as they prevent interest rates from 
falling, thus prolonging capital inflows. On the basis of data for 15 developing countries in 
Asia and Latin America over the period 1990-1996, Montiel and Reinhart (2000) conclude 
that sterilization increases the volume of capital inflows but also biases it towards more 
volatile short-term capital flows (compared to FDI). These concerns clearly seem to be 
surfacing in recent times in China, especially in 2003-2004.
23  
One way to overcome these costs is to reduce the monetary base directly by 
requiring banks to hold greater levels of reserves which may generate low-to-zero returns. 
While the PBOC has made frequent use of this policy as well (by raising reserve 
                                                 
22  While these results are instructive, an important caveat should be kept in mind. Since each 
forward recursive estimated offset and sterilization coefficients could be viewed as the average 
level of capital mobility and the average extent of sterilization respectively before the specific 
period, the estimation inherently puts more weights on the previous periods and makes the 
estimates bias toward it. 
 




requirements), the quasi-fiscal costs are merely transformed into banking costs as domestic 
banks' profitability is reduced, while bank management decisions (regarding asset 
allocation) are constrained. The costs to China’s financial system could become quite 
burdensome over time (if they have not already) considering the already weak state of the 
domestic financial system. Allowing for a higher degree of exchange rate flexibility should 
go some way in overcoming the inflationary pressures in China, though the extent and 
manner in which a more flexible exchange rate regime is to be introduced is too involved 
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Table 1: Legal Reserve Requirement Ratio in China, 1984 - 2004 
 
1984  Reserve requirement was 20% on business deposits, 40% on demand
deposits, and 25% on demand deposits in rural credit cooperatives. 
 
1985  Reserve requirement was reduced to 10% for all deposits.  
 
1987  Reserve requirement was raised to 12%. 
 
1988  Reserve requirement was raised further to 13%. 
 
March 1998  Reserve requirement was reduced to 8%.  
 
November 1999  Reserve requirement was reduced to 6%. 
 
September 2003  Reserve requirement was raised to 7%. 
 
April 2004  The system of differentiated reserve requirement ratio was adopted again. 
Legal reserve requirement was raised to 7.5% for most of financial 
institutions. However, in order to support the agricultural credit and the 
reform of the rural credit cooperatives, the reserve requirement for the urban 
and rural credit cooperatives were still 6%. The reserve requirement for the 










Table 2: Definitions and Measurement of the Variables Used in Empirical Study 
 
Variables  Definitions  Measured as  Data (Source) 
NFA ∆   The change in NFA scaled either by 
the GDP or by the lagged value of 
reserve money. 
t t GDP NFA / ∆  or 
1 / − ∆ t t RM NFA  
IFS 
NDA ∆   The change in NDA scaled either 
by the GDP or by the lagged value 
of reserve money. 
t t GDP NDA / ∆  or 
1 / − ∆ t t RM NDA  
IFS 
t mm   Money Multiplier for M2  M2/Reserve Money  IFS 
t mm ∆   The change in money multiplier for 
M2 
) ( ) ( 1 − − t t mm Log mm Log    
t REER   Real Effective Exchange Rate   IFS 
t c Y ,  
Cyclical Income. The real output 
growth rate deviated from its trend. 
The trend is measured by HP filter. 
Real GDP growth rate – HP 
filter Trend 
IFS and TEJ 
Great China 
Database 
t p ∆   Inflation Rate  Log (CPIt)-Log(CPIt-1)  TEJ Great China 
Database 
*
t r ∆   The change in foreign interest rate  Log (1+ US treasury rate)t – 
Log (1+US treasury rate)t-1 
IFS 
1 + ∆ t tS E  
The expected change in nominal 
exchange rate depreciation 
(Yuan/US).  
) ( ) ( 1 t t E Log E Log − +  
 if perfect foresight. 
IFS 
t c G ,  
Cyclical government fiscal balance 
scaled either by the GDP or by the 
lagged value of reserve money. The 
trend is measured by HP filter. 
Cyclical Fiscal Balance / GDP 
or Cyclical Fiscal Balance/ 
RMt-1 
IFS 
ex σ   Volatility of exchange rate  The standard deviation of the 
within quarter change in the 
monthly real effective exchange 
rate. 
IFS 
r σ   Volatility of domestic interest rate.  The standard deviation of the 
within quarter change in the 
monthly domestic interest rate 
(bank rate). 
IFS 
d1  Dummy variable for  0 < ∆ NDA   d1=2 if  0 < ∆ NDA ;  
0 otherwise.  
 
D2  Dummy variable for  0 < ∆ t NFA   d2=2 if  0 < ∆ t NFA ;  
0 otherwise. 
 
Q2-Q4  Seasonal dummies  Q2=1 if the second quarter; 
Q3=1 if the third quarter; 








Table 3: Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Empirical Study 
Variables N Mean Std  Dev Minimum  Maximum
Net Foreign Asset  40 1717.94 928.792  499.27 4376.88 
Net Domestic Asset  40 1846.84 338.264 1197.44 2451.24 
Reserve Money  40 3564.78 1128.600  1729.70  5947.21 
Nominal Exchange Rate 
(RMB/US$)  40 8.29 0.028  8.28  8.43 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 
(REER)  40 97.30 5.702 81.79  106.50 
M2  40 13329.19 5943.410  5028.33 25220.02 
GDP  40 2266.51 700.444  982.76 4337.04 
Bank Rate  40 5.26 2.993  2.70 10.44 
US Treasury Rate  40 3.84 1.814  0.92  6.04 
CPI  40 103.16 5.656 97.83  122.60 
Fiscal Balance  38 -31.39 117.537  -378.28  244.22 
Money Multiplier for M2  40 3.60 0.528 2.83 4.52 
Volatility of REER  40 0.88 0.513  0.09  2.03 






 Table 4: Unit Roots Test: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test 
 
Variables Type  of  Test  Unit Root?  
(ADF test Statistic) 
t NDA ∆  
(Scaled by lag value of monetary base) 
Drift and Trend  No (-6.921***) 
t NDA ∆  
(Scaled by GDP) 
Drift and Trend  No (-6.507***) 
t NFA ∆  
(Scaled by lag value of monetary base) 
None Yes  (0.538) 
t NFA ∆  
(Scaled by GDP) 
None Yes  (-0.174) 
t mm ∆   Drift No  (-6.63***) 
t REER   Drift No  (-3.301**) 
t c Y ,   None No  (-6.084) 
t p ∆   None No  (-2.471**) 
) ( 1
*
+ + ∆ t t t S E r   None No  (-1.857*) 
t c G ,  
(Scaled by lag value of monetary base) 
None No  (-7.534***) 
t c G ,  
(Scaled by GDP) 
None No  (-7.307***) 
1 , 1 ) 1 ( − − t r d σ   Drift and Trend  No (-5.326***) 
1 , 2 ) 1 ( − − t ex d σ   Drift No  (-5.176***) 
 
Note:   (*) Significant at more than 10%.   
(**) Significant at more than 5%.  






Table 5: Estimated Capital Inflows Function 
Dependent Variable:  t NFA ∆  
Scaled by Lag (RM)  Scaled by GDP  Period:  
1995: q1 - 2004: q4 
OLS Simultaneous OLS Simultaneous 
Intercept  0.15573***   
(0.04645)
0.155797***   
(0.037382)
0.16832*     
(0.08905) 
0.166013**   
(0.075676)
t NDA ∆   -0.56207***   
(0.11933)
-0.55828**   
(0.255927)
-0.52528***     
(0.12980) 
-0.54634**   
(0.255396)
t mm ∆   -0.53112***   
(0.12974)
-0.52742**   
(0.253499)
-0.72259***     
(0.21804) 
-0.75336*   
(0.382976)
1 − t REER   -0.0016***   
(0.00046)
-0.00161***   
(0.000380)
-0.00183**     
(0.00087) 
-0.00179**   
(0.000791)


















+ + ∆ t t t S E r   -0.0572**   
(0.02457)




-0.07223*   
(0.040838)
















1 − ∆ t NFA   0.26062*   
(0.12675)
0.26152**   
(0.115885)
0.3076**     
(0.14533) 


























R-square  0.7864 0.74016 0.6979  0.63286
Adj. R-square 
0.6749 0.6046 0.5403  0.4413
 
Note:   (*) Significant at more than 10%. 
(**) Significant at more than 5%. 





Table 6: Estimated Monetary Reaction Function 
 
Dependent Variable:  t NDA ∆  
Scaled by Lag (RM)  Scaled by GDP  Period:  
1995: q1 - 2004: q4 
OLS  Simultaneous OLS Simultaneous 
Intercept  0.13685**   
(0.05404)






t NFA ∆   -0.84644***   
(0.14240)
-0.73104***   
(0.176571)
-0.7732***     
(0.15627) 
-0.78682***   
(0.204985)
t mm ∆   -0.94344***   
(0.06995)
-0.93764***   
(0.057104)
-1.36736***     
(0.13198) 
-1.36782***   
(0.105657)
1 − t REER   -0.00151**   
(0.00056)














1 − ∆ t p   -0.31989
(0.20876)








1 t t t S E r − − + ∆   -0.06511**   
(0.02893)
-0.05978**   
(0.024252)
-0.09621*     
(0.05349) 
-0.09707**   
(0.043961)
t c G ,   0.3249
(0.19621)






1 , 1 ) 1 ( − − t r d σ   0.01054
(0.00827)






1 − ∆ t NDA   0.09801
(0.06398)














Q3  0.02199*   
(0.01266)






Q4  0.05068**   
(0.02409)






R-square  0.9696 0.96771 0.9467  0.94479
Adj. R-square  0.9537 0.95086 0.9189  0.91598
 
Note:  (*) Significant at more than 10%. 
(**) Significant at more than 5%. 





Table 7: Summary of Sterilization and Offset Coefficients Estimated  
from Previous Studies Since 1990
1 
 








Fry (1990)  Sri Lanka / A: 1960-87 
 
0.89 -0.65 
Kim (1995)  Korea / Q: 1980-1994  -0.76  -0.35 
Fry (1996)  27 Developing Countries
2 


























Sarjito (1996)  Indonesia/ Q: 1976-92 
 
-0.67 to -0.47  -0.50 
Rooskareni (1998)  Indonesia / M: 1978:2-1993:3 
 
-0.68 to -0.42  -0.25 
Savvides (1998)  Cameroon / A: 1975-88; 
Cote d’lvoire / A: 1970-91; 
Gabon / A 1969-92; 
Ghana / A: 1966-92; 




3  Hungary / M: 1992:01-1997:03 
 
-1 to -1.14  n.a. 
BGT (2002)  Germany / Q: 1979-92  -0.74  -0.22 
 
Emir et al. (2002)  Turkey / M: 1990-93 





Clavijo et al. (2003)  Colombia / Q: 1990-2003  -0.42  -0.78 
 
Notes:   1) All of these offset coefficients are estimated by simultaneous equations. 
2) 27 developing countries are Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Côte D’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, 
Greece, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
Portugal, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire. 
3) The sterilization coefficient in Siklos (1998) is estimated by OLS. But he also indicates that there 
is not much difference between the OLS estimation and two stage least squares. 



















































Current Account Capital Account Net Errors and Omissions
Total Reserve Minus Gold Change of Reserves Yuan/$ (End of Period)
 
 
Source:  IFS, the SAFE website and TEJ Great China Database 
 
 






































Net FDI Net Portfolio Investment Net Other Investment Capital Account
 


























































































































































































































































































































































Gross Debt Issuance Total Debt Outstanding
 








Figure 5: Quarterly Annual Growth Rate of Reserve Money, M2, and the  















































































































































































































































































Figure 7: Forward Recursive Estimated Offset Coefficients 
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OFFSET Coefficient (Scaled by Lag RM) 95% C.I.
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OFFSET Coefficient (Scaled by GDP) 95% C.I.
 
Note:   The offset coefficients estimated recursively by the simultaneous equations (12) and (13). The first estimate 
is estimated by using the sample from 1995:q1 to 2002:q1 and then adding one more observation each time 
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Sterilization Coefficient (Scaled by Lag RM) 95% C.I.
 
 




























































































Note:   The sterilization coefficients estimated recursively by the simultaneous equations (12) and (13). The first 
estimate is estimated by using the sample from 1995:q1 to 2002:q1 and then adding one more observation 
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